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It maybe said, that ... [anomnipotentnationallegis lature] would tend 
to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it 
to absorb in itself those residuary authorities, which it might be judged 
proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost 
latitude to the love of power, which any reasonable man can require, I 
confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons 
entrusted w ith the administration of the general government could 
ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. 
-Alexander Hamilton 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the Tenth Amendment2 was considered as nothing more than a 
"truism."3 The "truism" approach to federalism is not the Excalibur sword in 
the sheath of state sovereignty that the Amendment's language would seem to 
suggest. Rather, it has been a powerless statement of the obvious. An infirm 
Tenth Amendment, however, is no longer the prevailing view. Recently, the 
Supreme Court has shifted, using the Tenth Amendment to limit Congress's 
interference with the states' legislative4 and executive branches.s 
Various challenges have been filed that will test the Court's new doctrinal 
approach to the Tenth Amendment. In the field of environmental policy, for 
instance, certain provisions to the Clean Air Act6 ("CAA"), as modified by the 
1990 Amendments? are subject to scrutiny under these emerging standards of 
federalism.B The CAAArequires that the states create both a State Implementa-
lTHE FEOERAusrNo. 17, at 105 (Alexander Hamilton) Oacob E. Cooke ed., 1%1). 
2U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." 
3See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941): 
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not 
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to 
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between 
the national and state governments as it had been established by the 
Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than 
to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise 
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise 
fully their reserved powers. 
4See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
5See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
642 u.s.c. §§ 7401-7671q (1998). 
7Ciean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) 
(hereinafter ··cAAA'. or '"Act'"). 
Bsee infra note 60. 
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tion Plan9 ("SIP") for complying with the CAA, and a Permit Program for 
licensing operators of potential pollution-causing facilities.lO These provisions, 
along with the recently enacted sanctioning provisionsll for failing to submit 
a SIP or Permit Program, raise grave Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause12 
dilemmas. 
To date, the merits of any Tenth Amendment challenge to the CAAA have 
been limited to the Spending Clause without considering the Act as a whole.l3 
Consequently, the Spending Clause has given Congress a shield to protect itself 
from judicial invalidation of its intrusion upon the states. Does an Article I 
usurpation of the Tenth Amendment provide true protection to the principles 
of state sovereignty? The answer: not at all. The true test of state sovereignty 
resides within the Tenth Amendment. By using the Tenth Amendment to 
question congressional action first and then turning to the efficacy of an Article 
I power does the Tenth Amendment substantively prevent an "alienation of 
state sovereignty .... "14 
The question remains as to how far the Supreme Court will go in its 
refortification of the Tenth Amendment. This Note explores emerging 
federalism trends and evaluates the CAA in light of a stronger state sovereignty 
that is appearing on the constitutional horizon. Parts II and m examine the 
CAAA and the constitutional problems engendered by the Act. Part IV 
examines current Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause jurisprudence, and 
illustrates that the CAAA is a classic example of how Congress has been able 
to circumvent the Tenth Amendment with its Spending power. Part V presents 
a new view of federalism that is materializing in Commerce Clause15 and 
Eleventh Amendment16 doctrine, and extends that theory to the Tenth 
Amendment in the hope of finding a substantive bar on Congress's excessive 
use of the Spending power. Part VI calls for a restructuring of the CAAA to 
942 u.s.c. § 7410 (1998). 
1042 U.S.C. § 7661a (1998). 
1142 U .S.C. § 7509 (1998). 
12U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. 'The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States .... " 
13See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Virginia v. Browner, 117 S. Ct. 764 (1996) 
(No. 96-567). 
14THE FEDERAUST No. 81, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton) Oacob E. Cooke ed., 1%1). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3. "[The Congress shall have power to) regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.)" 
16U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of a Foreign 
State." 
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promote its high objectives, and concludes that unless the Act falls in line with 
the substantive federalism trend, its objectives will not be fulfilled . 
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
A. Purposes and Development of the CAA 
The problem of clean, breathable air is an issue of national importance. It is 
estimated that there are as many as 7,000 pollutants in the air people breathe 
into their lungs every day.17 The large number of pollutants and related health 
concerns make it easy to recognize why Congress seeks to regulate the evils of 
air pollution. 
The first attempts at controlling the nation's air quality came in the late 
Nineteenth Century after cities such as Chicago and Cincinnati passed 
ordinances to limit factory smoke emissions.18 The push toward cleaner air 
continued in the middle of the Twentieth Century after thousands of deaths 
occurred as the result of heavy fog in Pennsylvania and England .19 In 1955, the 
federal government entered the environmental arena, commissioning studies 
to evaluate the growing problem of air pollutants.20 Congress entered the 
regulatory field by enacting the first CAA in 1963.21 
The CAA of 1963 was a bare bones approach to the quest for clean air. The 
1963 Act created a legal process by which municipalities, states, and the federal 
government could institute regulatory actions against polluters .22 The 1963 Act 
a !so authorized funding for research projects on specific air pollution problems 
and on the removal of sulfur from fuels.23 
17See GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR AcroF 1990 41 
(1993). Air pollutants are the result of various natural and non-natural processes. For 
instance, pollutants can come from naturally occurring volcanic eruptions, forest fires, 
and windblown dust. Id. Other human-influenced pollution can come from 
wood-burning stoves, heating units, and industrial sources such as power plants and 
ore reduction facilities, to name just a few. Id. The largest contributor to the pollution 
problem, however, is the beloved automobile. It is estimated that automobile emissions 
comprise more than half of the air pollution in the United States. ld. 
18Jd. at 81. 
19Jd. 
20Actof July 14,1955, Pub. L. No.84-159, 69 Stat.322 (1955). The 1955 Act authorized 
the federal government to spend $5 million per year for five years to assist state 
governments with the research, training, and creation of demonstration projects for the 
control of air pollution. See AMERICAN ENTER. INST. FOR PuB. PoLICY RESEARCH, THE 
CLEAN ATR ACT: PROPOSALS FOR REVISIONS 79 n.l (1981 ). 
21etean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1857-18571 (1964)). 
22BRYNER, supra note 17, at 81. 
23 AMERlCAN ENTER. INST., supra note 20, at 2. 
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Since 1963, there have been several amendments to the CAA. The 1965 and 
1966 amendments required pollution control devices to be placed on 
automobiles,24 and authorized funding for state air-pollution control 
programs.25 While the initial CAA and its two subsequent amendments moved 
closer to establishing stronger pollution control measures, the structural 
framework that comprises the majority of thepresent-dayCAA was not created 
until 1970.26 
The 1970 Amendments to the CAA were enacted after the Nixon 
administration called for stronger environmental regulations. Yet, when the 
1970 version was passed, it was viewed as a bipartisan miracle.27 The 1970 
version was promulgated to achieve rather lofty goals28 and became the 
nation's toughest air-pollution control measures to date. 
The 1970 Amendments required the establishment and publication of 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS")29 to limit certain 
pollutants, and called for an end to the nation's pollution problems within five 
years.30 The 1970 Amendments also commanded the states' participation by 
requiring the formulation of State Implementation Plans for the establishment 
of the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") NAAQS.31 If a state failed 
to create a SIP, or created an inadequate SIP, the 1970 Amendments authorized 
24See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 202, 79 Stat. 992, 
992-93 (1965). 
25See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, § 3, 80 Stat. 954, 954 
(1966). 
26 AMERICAN ENTER. INST., supra note 20, at 2. 
27BRYNER, supra note 17, at 82-83. 
28See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1998). The purpose of the [CAA] is-
(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and 
the productive capacity of its population; 
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and develop-
ment program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution; 
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local 
governments in connection with the development and execution of 
their air pollution prevention and control programs; and 
(4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of 
regional air pollution prevention and control programs. 
29The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109, 84 Stat. 1676, 
1679-80 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1993)). 
30See Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110(e), 84 Stat. 1676, 1682 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e) 
(1988)), amended and repealed by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L. No. 
101-549, § llO(e), 104 Stat. 2399,2408-10 (codified at 42 U.S.C:§ 7410 (1991)). 
31See Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110, 84 Stat. 1676, 1680-83 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 
(1991)). 
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the EPA to either amend the plan or to preempt state involvement and create 
its own federal implementation plan ("FIP").32 
B. The Clean Air Act Amendments of1990 
While the 1970 Amendments were successful in reducing certain types of air 
pollution, the CAA's overriding goals remained elusive.33 Ostensibly for 
increasing environmental protection and strengthening the CAA, Congress 
passed, and President Bush signed into law the CAAA.34 The passage of the 
Act was considered by some "a remarkable political event and a landmark 
achievement in the making of environmental policy."35 
Structurally, the CAAA is similar to the 1970 statutory version. The Act 
maintained the earlier requirement that states write State Implementation 
Plans, but added a sanctioning provision for failure to submit a SIP.36 The 
CAAA also requires the states to create and implement a Permit Program for 
licensing sources of air pollutants, and imposes sanctions for failing to do so.37 
As with prior enactments, the states, under the CAAA "have [retained theJ 
primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area 
comprising such State .... "38 
32Jd. 
33BRYNER, supra note 17, at 49. 
34Jd. at 114. The CAAA was signed into law on November 15, 1990. 
35Jd. at 79. The CAAA was passed after a series of intense debates over both its 
provisions, and the economic impact the Act would have on the nation's fisc. For 
instance, industry calculations estimated the cost of complying with the Act would 
approach $104 billion per year, but environmentalists argued that the health costs of air 
pollution were just as high. See George Hager, Senate Takes Up Clean Air But Doesn't Get 
Very Far, CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP., Jan. 27, 1990, at 230. White House officials, industry 
lobbyists, and Senate critics argued that despite the enormous costs imposed by the 
CAAA, there were virtually no additional environmental protections born of the Act. 
BRYNER, supra note 17, at 101; see also 139 CONG. REc. 516845-01,516845 (daily ed. Nov. 
20, 1993) (statement of Mr. Baucus) (according to EPA estimates, more than half of all 
Americans still breathe unsafe air, and some toxic emissions have actually increased 
since the promulgation of the CAAA). 
Prior to its enactment, the future of the CAAA was uncertain as the Act bounced 
between various committee meetings and dosed-door negotiations. BRYNER, supra note 
17, at 101-05. Finally, after several all-night sessions of Congress and major changes at 
the demand of industry lobbyists, the House of Representatives passed the CAAA on 
October 26, 1990 by a vote of 401-25, and the Senate passed it the next day. ld. at 114. 
36Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 110, 104 Stat. 2399, 2407-08 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 
(1991)}. 
37Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 502, 104 Stat. 2399, 2635-41 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7661a 
(1995)). 
3842 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1998). 
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C. Functioning of the 1990 Amendments 
1. State Implementation Plans 
165 
Under the CAAA, the federal government requires the states to create the 
structural underpinnings of the CAA.39 The Act pronounces that, after national 
ambient air quality standards40 are established by the EPA, each state shall 
within three years, either individually or as part of an interstate compact, 
provide a plan for implementing, maintaining, and enforcing the NAAQS 
within the state or region.41 The SIP is to include, inter alill, measures to enact 
pollution monitoring programs,42 assurances from the state to its local 
governments that adequate funding and personnel will be available to carry 
out the SIP,43 requirements that potential polluters install and maintain special 
equipment if so commanded by the EPA Administrator,44 and provisions for 
consultation and participation by local political subdivisions.45 
After a SIP is submitted, the Act specifies that the EPA Administrator will 
render a ruling as to whether the state's proposed SIP comports with the CAA' s 
requirements.46 The Administrator will then approve the plan or return it to 
the state for revision.47 If two years have passed and the Administrator is not 
satisfied with the revised SIP, or if the state fails to submit a plan, the Act directs 
that the Administrator shall promulgate a federal program for the state.48 
Additionally, any time after the Administrator becomes dissatisfied with the 
state plan, sanctions are imposed on the state.49 
39Jd. 
40NAAQS are separated into primary and secondary standards. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409(a)(l)(A) (1998). Primary standards seek to provide an adequate level of safety 
necessary to protect the public health. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b )(1) (1998). Secondary standards 
specify a level of air quality requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or 
expected adverse effects associated with air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (1998). 
After an extensive review of expert scientific reports, the EPA established ambient 
standards for the pollutants ozone, lead, sulfur dioxide, particulates, nitrogen dioxide, 
and carbon monoxide. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 5 (1989}, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3385,3391. 
4142 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1998). 
4242 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(B)(i) (1998). 
4342 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1998). 
4442 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(F}(i) (1998). 
4542 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(M) (1998). 
4642 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(B) (1998). 
47[d. 
4842 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1998). 
4942 U.S.C. §§ 7509(a)(4), 7410(m) (1998}; see also infra Part II.C.3 (providing a detailed 
description of the CAAA's sanctioning provisions). 
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2. Permit Programs 
In a second mandate issued by the CAAA, the Governor of each state is 
required to develop and submit a permit program for licensing potential 
polluters in designated attainment areas .SO Under the mandate, the 
Administrator would review the plan and either approve or disapprove the 
Governor's blueprint.Sl If the Administrator disapproved any aspect of the 
Permit Program, the Governor must make revisions and resubmit the plan. 52 
If the state's Governor fails to submit a plan, or submits an unacceptable 
plan, the Administrator may impose sanctions until eighteen months after the 
required submission period has expired.53 If the eighteen-month period has 
lapsed and the Governor has still not submitted a plan, or has failed to revise 
a disapproved plan, the Administrator is statutorily required to impose certain 
sanctions on that state.54 The mandatory sanctions continue for four months, 
after which the Administrator shall create, administer, and enforce a federal 
permit program for the state.55 
3. Sanctions under the CAAA 
The CAAA gives the EPA Administrator authority to impose mandatory 
sanctions on the states for failing to submit SIPs and permit programs.56 In an 
effort to bring the states into compliance, the Administrator is required to cut 
off all federal highway fundinginnon-attainmentareas.57The Actdoesexempt 
from the mandatory sanctions funding for projects which the Secretary of 
Transportation determines are related to the promotion of safety or to decreases 
in auto emissions.SS As an alternative to highway-funding sanctions, the 
Administrator is permitted to increase the ratio of emission reductions to 
increased emissions from new sources by at least a two-to-one margin before 
a permit can be issued to a source.59 
5042 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(l) (1998). Along with the permit program, the Governor must 
submit a legal opinion from the state Attorney General that the laws of the state or 
locality provide adequate authority to carry out the program. Id. 
5lJd. 
52/d. 
5342 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(2)(A) (1998). 
5442 U .S.C.§ 7661a(d)(2)(B) (1998); see also infra Part II.C.3 (providing a detailed look 
at the CAAA's sanctioning provisions). 
5542 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(3) (1998). 
5642 U.S.C. §§ 7509(a)(l)-(3)(A)(4) (1998). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(l)(A) (1998). 
5842 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(l)(B) (1998). 
5942 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(2) (1998). The offset sanctions require sources seeking to add 
to, or build new industrial operations in non-attainment areas to designate two tons of 
volatile organic compounds reductions for every one ton of increased emissions 
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Ill. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CAAA 
Recent constitutional challenges to the CAAA have been resolved in favor 
of the CAA.60 The suits against the Act have been concerned primarily with 
the Spending Clause.61 In many instances, the courts have "evaded the Tenth 
Amendment issue ... by ignoring the mandatory language of [the SIP and 
Permit Program requirements] by dividing the challenged statutory scheme 
into discrete provisions, and by examining each [separately] without analyzing 
the workings of the whole."62 Thus, legal examination of the CAAA has been 
limited to a cursory look at a single tree in a forest of constitutional problems. 
Despite judicial support for the CAAA, recent developments in federalism 
doctrine may cause portions of the Act to be held unconstitutional.63 Both the 
State Implementation Plan and Permit Program requirements issue direct 
commands to the states' legislative and executive branches to promulgate and 
enforce federal regulatory programs.64 Standing alone, a federal directive 
requiring a state to enact specific legislation is not within Congress's 
empowerment.65 Similarly, Congress cannot force a state's executive branch 
into performing a legislative function or enforcing a federal regulatory 
prograrn.66 To permit the federal government to intrude upon the states in this 
manner is "fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual 
sovereignty."67 
stemming from the project. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(5) (1998). 
60See Virginia v. Browner,80 F.3d869(4th Cir.l996),cert. denied,l17S. Ct. 764 (1996); 
Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320 (E. D. Mo. 1996 }, vacated and dismissed for lack 
ofjurisdiction, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Virginia v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 
537 (E.D. Va. 1995) (constitutional challenge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction), affd, 74 
F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 1996). 
61In Browner, for example, the Fourth Circuit held that the sanctioning provisions 
were a mere inducement to get states to fall into compliance with the CAAA, rather than 
an unconstitutional"outright coercion" used to force a state to enact federal legislation. 
80 F.3d at 881 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S.l44, 166 (1992)). Additionally, 
the sanctions were held to be a proper condition on "federal funds ... 'reasonably related 
to the purpose for which the funds are expended.'" Browner, 80 F.3d at 881 (quoting 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,213 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
62Pelition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Virginia v. Browner, 117 S. Ct. 764 (1996) (No. 
96-567). 
63See infra Part V. 
64See supra notes 37, 46 and accompanying text. 
65New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992). 
66Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365,2384 (1997). 
67Jd. The notion that Congress should be limited in its exercise of power over the 
states is an inherent foundation on which our system of government was created. ld. 
The framers sought to allocate governmental power in a manner that maximized the 
democratic ability of all individuals because "[t]he accumulation of all powers 
legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, 
and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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The difficulty with the CAAA is that states are not simply required to enact 
federal legislation. The states are given the choice-however questionable that 
choice may be-to either comply with the Act's mandates or surrender all 
participation in environmental regulation to the federal government.68 When 
a state is given the choice of participating in a federal plan according to certain 
congressional requirements, or having Congress take over the regulation, the 
Supreme Court has held the structure to constitute a system of cooperative 
federalism that is not violative of state sovereignty.69 The ghostly appearance 
of a cooperative choice in the CAAA is the reason Tenth Amendment challenges 
to the Act have been arrested at federalism's front door?O 
What differentiates the CAAA from a system of pure cooperative federalism, 
however, is the presence of the sanctioning provisions. While it is arguable that 
the sanctioning provisions alone violate the Spending Clause,71 its interaction 
with the SIP and Permit Program requirements raise interesting questions. As 
a starting point, do the SIP and Permit Program requirements truly harmonize 
with federalism principles after recent Supreme Court decisions? Secondly, 
does the plenary nature of Congress's Spending power alter the CAAA's 
constitutional defects? Finally, what does the future hold for the Spending 
Clause under a theory of substantive federalism? 
definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 Oames Madison) Qacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
The Constitutional Convention produced several plans for the structure of the new 
government and, in the end, adopted a form of government that operated on individuals 
directly rather than one that sought to regulate through coercive measures taken against 
states. New York, 505 U.S. at 164-65 (citing 1 RECORDSOFTIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 21, 243-44, 313 (M. Farrand ed., 1911)). The history and debate behind the 
Constitution seemingly suggest that state sovereignty is a core principle necessary to 
the proper functioning of government. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) 
("[T]he States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, 
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REv. 499, 525 (1995) (federalism values provide three 
major benefits of protecting State governments: "decreasing the likelihood of federal 
tyranny, enhancing democratic rule by providing government that is closer to the 
people, and allowing states to be laboratories for new ideas.") 
68See supra notes 48,55 and accompanying text. 
69See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) 
(FERC) (allowing Congress to give States the opportunity to participate in a preemptible 
federal field according to federal command, or completely surrendering State 
involvement); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 
288-89 (1981) (upholding the steep-slope provisions of the Surface Mining and Control 
Act as providing a legitimate choice between continued State participation in a federal 
regulatory plan or surrendering all involvement to the federal government). But see infra 
nole 284 (identifying problematic assumptions with the FERC model of complete state 
preemption). 
70See, e.g., Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 882-83 (4th Cir. 1996). 
71See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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IV. THE CURRENT "STATE" OF TENTH AMENDMENT AND SPENDING CLAUSE 
DocTRINE 
A. The Tenth Amendment 
The Tenth Amendment has been on a roller-coaster ride through the 
Supreme Court during the past twenty years. Recently, the pro-federalism 
five72 have come into the majority and have shifted 180 degrees on the issue of 
states' rights providing for a stronger Tenth Amendment. 
1. The Brethren's War Begins 
The furor over state sovereignty began in 1976 when the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in National Leilgue of Cities v. Usery?3 This decision 
struck down certain provisions in the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act,74 enacted under Congress's Commerce power, as impinging on 
"the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional 
governmental functions . .. . "75 
National League of Cities represented a departure from the Court's view of the 
Commerce Clause.76 The majority decision was criticized as "discarding [the] 
postulate that the Constitution contemplates that restraints upon . .. 
Congress['s] ... plenary commerce power lie in the political process and not in 
the judicial process," a postulate which had been in force for 152 years.77 The 
controversial theories announced in the decision were urged upon the Court 
five times in tlle m::xt seven years, with no success?S In two of Ute decisions, 
Justice Blackmun, who was in the majority in National League of Cities, switched 
72The '"pro-federalism five" refers to Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Associate Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. In several 5-4 decisions, the "five" have 
strengthened the power of state governments over their federal counterpart. 
73426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528 (1985), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985). 
7429 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1998). 
75National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. The Court expressed three criteria that 
must be proven to uphold a Tenth Amendment challenge against an exercise of the 
commerce power. First, the challenged statute must regulate the '"States as States." ld. at 
845. Second, the statute must attempt to control matters that are classically "attribute[s] 
of state sovereignty." Id. at 845. Lastly, it must be shown that state compliance would 
impair the state's ability to structure operations of a traditional government function. 
Id. at 852. 
76In its decision, the Court expressly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 
{1968), which held that the commerce power is not limited by state sovereignty. National 
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855. 
77Jd. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
197 (1824)). 
78See W11.LIAM B. LOCKHARTET AL., CONSfiTUnONAL LAW 146 (8th ed. 1996). 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
170 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:159 
sides and was instrumental in the death of the Court's short-lived dance with 
stronger Tenth Amendment protections.79 
2. Enter Garcia 
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court examined 
the constitutionality of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, enacted under Congress's Commerce power, as applied 
to a public mass-transit authority.so In concluding that federal law did apply 
to state entities, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, expressly rejected 
the principles set down in National League of Cities.Bl 
The Court had grave doubts about the efficacy of distinguishing between 
what "traditional" and "non-traditional" government functions would be.82 
Justice Blackmun argued that differentiating between "traditional" and 
"non-traditional" governmental functions failed to protect federalism in the 
constitutional structure because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal 
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones 
it dislikes."83 Rather, the appropriate method to protect state sovereignty lies 
not within the Tenth Amendment, but within the structure of the Constitution 
itself.84 "The Federal Government was designed .. . to protect the States from 
overreaching by Congress ... [by giving] the States a role in the selection both 
of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Govemment."85 
State sovereignty, therefore, is better "protected by the procedural safeguards 
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created 
limitations on federal power.''86 
79Jd. 
80469 u.s. 528,533 (1985). 
BlJd. at 557. 
82Jd. at 538. What the Court found disturbing was the lower courts' confusion in 
applying the National League of Cities standard./d. at 538-39. There was no consensus in 
the Circuit and District courts as to what was and was not a "traditional" government 
function. Id. 
83[d. at 545-46. 
84Jd. at 550. 
85Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51 (citing }FSSE H. CHOPER, jUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLmCAL PROCESS 174-84 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 
54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism 
Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 
779 (1982)). 
86Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552; see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) 
(holding that Tenth Amendment protections are "structural, not substantive-i.e., that 
States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national 
political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity.") 
But see Anthony B. Ching, Travelling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez, New 
York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 99, 114 (1995) (the 
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In discussing Congress's Commerce power, Justice Blackmun stated that 
while "we .. . recognize that the states occupy a special and specific position in 
our constitutional system ... the principal and basic limit on the federal 
commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in 
restraints that our system provides through the state participation in the 
[political process.]"87 The political process, in other words, assures that 
Congress will not use the Commerce Clause to unduly burden the states.88 
The dissent did not take the denigration of the Tenth Amendment Lightly. 
Justice Powell reasoned that the Court's opin.ion "effectively reduce[d] the 
Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause."89 Justice Powell did not believe that the political process 
provided adequate protection for state sovereign interests.90 Rather, the 
appropriate defender of federalism is the Tenth Amendment because "[t]he 
States' role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not 
of legislative grace."'91 
Justice O'Connor expanded on Powell's dissent and argued that the Court 
failed to address the Constitution's dual interest in federalism and a strong 
Commerce power.92 The Constitution conferred powers upon the federal 
government that were "few and defined," and did not render the states a pawn 
in the constitutional structure.93 Justice O'Connor argued that the framers' 
intent was not to have a federal government of all encompassing powers (such 
as the Commerce or Spending powers), but to assure that the states "retain their 
integrity in a system in which the laws of the United States are nevertheless 
supreme."94 State autonomy, therefore, deserves affirmative limits on the 
"political process" reasoning of Garcia repudiates the doctrine set forth in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that the power to interpret the Constitution 
belongs to the Court, not to Congress); Deborah J. Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: 
Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1570-71 (1994) (arguing that the 
"state autonomy model"" of federalism from New York, which allows courts to intervene 
in the political process to protect the independence of state governments, is superior to 
the "political process" reasoning of Garcia). 
87Garcia,469 U.S. at 556. 
BBJd. 
89 Id. at 560. 
90 !d. at 564-65; see also Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated 
Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995) (arguing that 
the political process is an insufficient guardian of the principles of federalism). 
91Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567. 
92Jd. at 581. 
93[d. at 582 (quoting THE FEDERAUST No.45, at 313 Games Madison) Gacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961)). 
94Garcia, 469 U.S. at 585 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,547 n.7 (1975)). 
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Commerce power:95 limits that Justice O'Connor promised would come to 
fruition in the future.% 
3. How Toxic Waste Changed the Tenth Amendment-Again 
The Supreme Court shifted dramatically when it examined the 
constitutionality of an enactment designed to achieve the safe disposal of 
radioactive wastes in New York v. United States.97 The Act contained three core 
provisions with the intent of encouraging states to comply with the disposal 
regulations.98 First, the Act provided monetary incentives that permitted states 
with disposal sites to tax incoming waste from non-sited states.99 The Act also 
provided access incentives that allowed sited states to charge higher disposal 
fees and denied access to its disposal facilities to any non-sited states which 
failed to comply with the Act.IOO The final incentive was a "take title" provision 
commanding any state that failed to comply with the Act to accept possession, 
title, and assume all liability for the radioactive wastes generated within its 
borders)Ol 
Justice O'Connor, now in the majority, found the monetary and access 
incentives constitutionally sound, but was troubled by the "take title" 
provision.102 The "take title" provision provided states with the choice of either 
regulating according to Congress's commands, or accepting radioactive waste 
as a punishment for non-compliance.103 By providing states with this 
particular "choice," Congress "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement 
from coercion."104 
The Court viewed Tenth Amendment sovereignty as the "mirror image" of 
two inquiries. lOS "If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the 
Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the 
States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth 
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on 
Congress."106 Thus, the Tenth Amendment's power comes not from the 
95Garcia, 469 U.S. at 587. 
96Jd. at 589. 
97so5 u.s. 144, 149-51 (1992). 
98[d. at 152. 
99 Id. at 152-53. 
100Jd. at 153. 
101Jd. at 153-54. 
102New York, 505 U.S. at 171-74. 
103Jd. at 174-75. 
104Jd. at 175. 
l05[d. at 156. 
l06Jd. 
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Amendment itself, which is basically a "tautology," but rather from whether 
"an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I 
power."107 
Justice O'Connor noted that the Constitution was never intended to give 
Congress the ability to require states to govern according to Congress's 
direction.lOS The Constitutional Convention evidenced this intent by allowing 
Congress to exercise its power over individuals, not states.109 Congress, 
however, may urge, by methods falling short of outright coercion, states to 
adopt legislative programs consistent with federal interests.llO Notably, 
Congress has the power to offer states the choice of regulating according to 
federal standards, or having state law preempted by federal regulation.111 
The rationale behind the legitimacy of the "cooperative federalism" model is 
that states retain the ultimate decision to comply with the legislation, or to have 
the federal government take over the field.ll2 The take title provision, the Court 
observed, did not give states any real choice)13 Justice O'Connor held that the 
"take title" provision, and its forced transfer of radioactive waste, is no different 
than an unconstitutional, congressionally compelled subsidy from the state to 
waste producers.114 Similarly, the mere directive that the state regulate 
according to federal standards is an unconstitutional command.115 "Either type 
of federal action would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of 
federal regulatory purposes .... "116 The Court stated that Congress cannot 
offer a state this "choice," because "[a] choice between two unconstitutionally 
coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all."117 
The United States raised the argument that the Constitution's prohibition on 
federal commands to state governments can be overcome if there is a 
sufficiently important federal interest. US The Court rejected this argument, 
holding that, regardless of even the most exacting federal interest, Congress 
does not have the constitutional authority to require states to regulate 
107New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57. 
108/d. at 162. 
109 /d. at 164-65 (citations omitted). 
110 Id. at 166 (emphasis added). 
111Jd. at 167 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 
264,288 (1981)). 
112New York, 505 U.S. at 167-69. 
113Jd. at 175. 
114Jd. 
115Jd. at 175-76. 
116Jd. at 175. 
117 New York, 505 U.S. at 176. 
118/d. at 177. 
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according to its directives.119 If a "federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause 
Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state 
governments as its agents."120 
Justice O'Connor also argued that commandeering state governments to act 
as agents of Congress violates principles of democratic accountability.121 
According to the Court's previous decision, the Constitution was designed to 
create two spheres of government- one federal and the other state-each with 
their own "set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and 
are governed by it."122 Moreover, the responsibility of state government is to 
remain responsive to its local electorate, and accountable to its own citizens.123 
The Court reasoned that when Congress compels a state to regulate, it makes 
the state accountable for federal legislation and subjects local officials to public 
disapproval that should actually be directed toward Congress.l24 
In addition, Justice O'Connor continued the chastisement of Congress's 
Commerce power that she began in Garcia. While the Commerce Clause was 
intended to be sufficiently powerful to avoid the problems of interstate trade 
disputes that were widespread under the Articles of Confederation, the 
Framers did not intend that the Commerce power could be exercised by forcing 
states to regulate according to Congress's mandates.J25 "As Madison and 
Hamilton explained, 'a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over 
governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from 
individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the 
order and ends of civil polity."'l26 
1. PRINTZ v. UNITED STATES 
In 1997, the Supreme Court expanded on the principles of state sovereignty 
announced in New York. In addition to affording the states' legislative branch 
protection from congressional intrusion, the states' executive branches have 
been given the same protections. 
119[d. at 178. 
120Jd. 
121 /d. at 168. 
122U.~. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurnng); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 256 Games Madison) Gacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
123New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
124Jd. at 168-69. 
125/d. at 180. 
l~6New Yor~, 505 U.S. at 180 (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 20, at 138 Games Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). One might wonder what the ultimate import of this view 
is for international law, and international legal entities such as the World Court of Justice 
or the GAIT appellate process. 
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The question in Printz v. United States was whether the interim provisions of 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which commanded state and 
local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective 
handgun purchasers and other related tasks, violated the Constitution.127 The 
Brady Act required the chief law enforcement officer ("CLEO") of the locality 
where the handgun was being purchased to make a reasonable effort to 
determine whether the sale or possession of the firearm would be in violation 
of the Brady Act.128 The interim provisions essentially commanded state law 
enforcement officers to participate in the administration of a federally enacted 
regulatory plan.129 Justice Scalia held the Act unconstitutional for several 
reasons.130 
First, the Court's opinion dispensed with the federal government's 
argument that enlisting state executive officers to implement federal law was 
an acceptable action dating back to the framing of the Constitution.131 Earlier 
laws enlisting the state judiciary in enforcing federal proscriptions that were 
appropriate for the judicial power were deemed acceptable under the 
Supremacy Clause.132 The Court identified several earlier statutes that 
imposed requirements upon state judges, but found no statutes imposing on 
the states' executive branches.133 This legislative void, the Court found, 
indicates that early federal legislators assumed the absence of power to 
command states' executives.134 This is an absence the Court was loathe to 
overturn. 
127117 S. Ct. 2365, 2368 (1997). 
128/d. at 2369. 
129 ld. 
130 Id. at 2384. 
131Prinfz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370. 
l32Jd. at 2371. 
133[d. 
l34Jd. The early statutes did not direct the states' judiciary to perform functions that 
could be characterized as executive rather than judicial.Id. at 2371 n.2. The commanded 
actions fell within the separate sphere of the judicial power. Id. But see Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957 (1993). Prakash argues 
that the constitutional Framers intended that Congress could compel state executive 
officials to administer federal law because they could not easily defy federal authority. 
ld. at 2035. This argument focuses on solely historical theories underlying the state 
executive's role in the constitutional structure as a basis for federal commandeering of 
state executives. ld. at 1990-2007. While Printz did examine the Framers' intent, 117 S. 
Ct. at 2378, it examined this intent with a more functional analysis of early laws and 
how they were applied to the states. ld. at2370-71. Whereas field Office Federa~ism looked 
at static theories, Printz looked at those same theories in the dynam1c of early 
congressional enactments and concluded ~hat the Framers' intent was not to ha:re the 
federal government conscript state executives. The Prmtz Court, then, may be v1ewed 
as furthering the "organic document'" concept by recognizing that "[l~aw reache~ past 
formalism." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992); see also Erwm Chemennsky, 
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The Court held that modem doctrine, similar to historical laws, does not 
extend congressional control to state executives.135 Justice Scalia believed that 
the statutes cited by the govenunent were better characterized as conditions 
upon the grant of federal funds rather than a direct mandate to the states.136 
The essential issue in Printz was not conditional grants, but rather the "forced 
participation of the States' executive in the actual administration of a federal 
program."l37 
The second reason why the Brady Act was constitutionally infirm was that 
it circumvented the Constitution's executive structure. Justice Scalia argued 
that the Constitution "does not leave to speculation who is to administer the 
laws enacted by Congress; [it is to be] the President, ... personally and through 
officers whom he appoints .... "138 Allowing Congress to require that CLEOs 
enforce the Brady Act without meaningful presidential control, would shatter 
the unity-insisted by the Framers to ensure "vigor and accountability" in 
enforcing laws-and the constitutional power of the President to act under the 
enumerated Article ll powers.139 
Justice Scalia then focused on the dissent and its argument that the Brady 
Act is a justifiable exercise of the Commerce power by virtue of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.l40 
Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. Sr. U. L. REv. 959 {1997) (stating 
that a functional analysis of federalism issues is superior to formalistic methods because 
functionalism makes better use of actual public needs and what methods provide for 
the best governance). 
135Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2375. 
136fd. at 2376. 
137ld. Of interest in this section of the opinion, Justice Scalia alludes that the 
conditional granting of federal funds for purposes of encouraging states to enact federal 
programs may not be a proper exercise of Congress's power under the Spending Clause. 
/d. As Justice O'Connor promised in the Garcia dissent, Justice Scalia stated the time will 
come to scrutinize that power when the issue is properly before the Court. Id. 
138Jd. at 2378 {citing U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2). 
139 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378 {citing THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)); see 
also Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. 
REv. 23, 58-70 (1995) (addressing why the President and his subordinates, to a national 
constituency, are the only proper enforcers of federal law); Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 
15 CAROOZO L. REv. 201, 204-06 (1993) (discussing presidential control under differing 
unitary executive theories). 
140Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378-79. The Necessary and Proper Clause declares that 
Congress shall have Power .. [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof ... U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, d. 18. The Necessary and Proper Clause is believed to 
be the source of the federal preemption power (such as the one present in the CAAA). 
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REv. 795, 801 (19%). 
Professor Gardbaum argues that the preemption power should be affirmatively limited 
by federalism values.ld. at826. The import of this argument in relation to the substantive 
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The dissent .. . resorts to the last, best hope of those who defend ultra 
vires congressional action, the Necessary and Proper Clause. It reasons 
that the power to regulate the sale of handguns under the Commerce 
Clause, coupled with the power to "make aU Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers," conclusively establishes the Brady Act's constitutional 
validity, because the Tenth Amendment imposes no limitations on the 
exercise of delegated powers but merely prohibits the exercise of 
powers "not delegated to the United States." What destroys the 
dissent's ... argument, however, is not the Tenth Amendment but the 
Necessary and Proper Clause itself. When a "La{w] ... for carrying into 
Execution" the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state 
sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we 
mentioned earlier, it is not a "la[w] ... proper for carrying into 
Execution the Commerce Clause," and thus, in the words of the 
Federalist, "mere~ [an] ac[t] of usurpation" which "deserve[s] to be 
treated as such."1 
177 
The dissent's argument, in other words, fails because the Commerce Clause 
authorizes direct congressional control over interstate commerce-it does not 
authorize Congress to "regulate state governments' regulation of interstate 
commerce. "142 
In its attempt to validate the Brady Act, the government tried to distinguish 
New York, by arguing that, unlike the "take title" provisions in New York, the 
Brady Act did not require state legislative or executive officials to make policy, 
but required only the implementation of a federal directive.l43 The Court 
disagreed, underscoring the language in the Brady Act that requires CLEOs to 
exert reasonable efforts in determining who is eligible to purchase a 
handgun.t44 
In its fifth reason for holding the Brady Act unconstitutional, the Court stated 
that the decision to apply maximal reasonable efforts, or minimal reasonable 
federalism theory is similar. Before Congress can take legislative action it must look to 
principles of state sovereignty first. 
141Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (citation omitted) (emphasis original). 
142Jd. at 2379 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)). In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued for the devolution of the herculean 
Commerce power. In what he termed a "revisionist" view, Justice Thomas urged that 
the Constitution places whole areas of regulation outside the reach of Congress's 
enumerated powers. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385-86 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I (the 
Establishment Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. U ("the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms.")) Similar to the theory of substantive federalism, see infra Part V.C., Justice 
Thomas seems to imply that Article I powers cannot be exercised in such a manner as 
to transgress upon other constitutional provisions. 
143 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380. 
144Jd. at 2381. 
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efforts was preeminently a matter of policy.145 Justice Scalia argued that the 
absence of a policymaking function in an executive is rare, and that even if the 
Brady Act does not require policymaking, the intrusion on state sovereignty is 
still significant.146 "Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous 
political entities is arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy 
in certain fields than ... by ' reduc[ing] [them] to puppets of a ventriloquist 
Congress.' "147 Nevertheless, the Court stated that congressional 
commandeering of a state's executive officer is never constitutionally 
acceptable.148 
Next, Justice Scalia argued that the interim provisions of the Brady Act also 
failed Tenth Amendment scrutiny because of the diminished accountability of 
Congress.149 The Court believed that requiring state governments to absorb the 
financial burden of implementing a federal program allowed Congress to take 
credit for the success of the Act without having to ask its constituents to pay 
higher taxes.150 Even if higher costs are not incurred by the state, it is the CLEO, 
and not federal officials, that will be blamed for the Act's burdens and 
defects.lSl 
Furthermore, the Court deemed insignificant the fact that the Brady Act 
enlisted individual state officers, and not the Executive branch as a whole. 
"While the Brady Act is directed to 'individuals,' it is directed to them in their 
official capacities as state officers; it controls their actions, not as private 
citizens, but as agents of the State."152 According to Justice Scalia, to grant Tenth 
Amendment immunity from direct congressional interference with the state, 
but allow indirect control over state officers, is nothing more than ··empty 
formalistic reasoning of the highest order."153 
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the argument that the temporary and 
minimal nature of the interim provisions, and the important interests it serves, 
justifies congressional intrusion on the states' executive officials.154 The Court 
held that a balancing test may be appropriate in certain circumstances, but 
145Jd. 
146Jd. 
147Jd. (quoting Brown v. EPA,521 F.2d 827,839 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
148Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381. 
149 I d. at 2382; see also supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (discussing New York's 
democratic accountability concerns). 
150Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382. 
15l[d. 
152Jd.; cf Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that, 
for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, a suit against a state officer acting in 
an official state capacity is no different than a suit against the state). 
153Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382 (citation omitted). 
l54Jd. at 2383. 
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where the purpose of a law is to direct the functioning of the state's executive 
and to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, a balancing 
test is never suitable.ISS 
B. The Spending Clause 
The courts have dispatched federalism challenges to the CAAA by looking 
to the Spending Clause as opposed to the Tenth Amendment.l56 As a result, 
the Spending power has been used to transform otherwise unconstitutional 
commands into permissible actions. When used in this manner, the Spending 
Clause gives Congress a super hero's power to reach areas that are normally-in 
more Clark Kent-like circumstances-beyond its legitimate grasp. 
The Court articulated its current view of the Spending Clause in South Dakota 
v. Dole.157 Dole addressed the question of whether Congress could withhold 
federal highway funds if a state refused to raise its minimum drinking age to 
twenty-one years of age.158 It was argued that setting a minimum drinking age 
was a power reserved exclusively for the states under the Twenty-first 
Amendment.159 The state also argued that Congress could not intrude upon 
this power by using the Spending Clause.160 Despite the federalism question 
presented by the parties, the Court focused on the Spending Clause and 
Congress's power to condition funding even in areas that it could not regulate 
otherwise.l61 
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, under the Spending Clause, Congress 
may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds in order to achieve state 
compliance with broad federal policy objectives and commands.162 "(T]his 
power ... 'is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the 
Constitution.' Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I' s 'enumerated 
155Jd. 
156See supra notes 60-61. 
157483 u.s. 203 (1987). 
158Jd. at 205. 
159Jd. The Twenty-first Amendment states that .. [t]he transportation or importation 
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein 
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CoNST. 
amend. XXI,§ 2. 
160Dole, 483 U.S. at 205. 
161/d. at 206. 
162Jd.; see also Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) 
(attaching condition that state employees refrain from partisan political activities if they 
are paid with federal funds); Helvering v. Davis, 30~ U.S. 6~ ~ (1937) (provi~ing fede:al 
funds to states that assist in establishment of certam prov1s1ons of the Soetal Secunty 
Act); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (requiring states to aid in the 
administration of provisions within the Social Security Act in order to receive federal 
funds); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (granting federal monies to states 
to help reduce maternal and infant mortality rates). 
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legislative fields, ' may nevertheless be attained through the use of [conditional 
grants under} the spending power .... "163 
The Court, however, did place limitations on the Spending power. The first 
limitation, from the language of the Spending Clause, dictates that any use of 
the Spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare.164 The general 
welfare in safe interstate highway travel was impeded by having differing 
minimum drinking ages in different states.l65 Unsafe driving conditions were 
aggravated when underage drivers were encouraged to drive into other states 
with lower minimum drinking ages.l66 By conditioning federal funds on states 
raising the minimum drinking age, Congress was acting in a manner 
"reasonably calculated to advance the general welfare."167 
Next, "if Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it 
'must do so unambiguously ... , enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation."'l68 Under this 
restriction, it is conceivable that an inducement to comply with the federal 
interest may become so coercive as to "pass the point at which 'pressure turns 
163Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)). 
164Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. What constitutes "for ... the general welfare" is a question 
that the courts should grant considerable deference to Congress's interpretation. Id. In 
essence, this is similar to the "political process" reasoning of Garcia. See Thomas R. 
McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. Cr. 
REv. 85, 123-25. Although beyond the scope of this Note, this aspect of the Dole test is 
problematic. Professors McCoy and Friedman argue that the "political process" 
reasoning, if applicable at all, makes more sense in a Garcia-like situation. Id. at 124. 
Commerce-based regulation, where Congress regulates directly, is more likely to alert 
the electorate to congressional abuses. Id. Conditional spending, on the other hand, is 
less likely to tip-off the body politic because the state bears the ultimate responsibility 
whether to comply with the condition. Id. at 124-25. Much like New York impliedly 
abandoned Garcia's "political process" rationale by placing judicial limits on national 
interference with state governments, the time may come when the Court abandons this 
approach in its Spending Clause cases. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal 
Spending After Lopez, 95 CowM. L. REv. 1911, 1962-63 (1995) (proposing that the courts 
alter the current Dole test in favor of a test which will presuppose as invalid any attempt 
to regulate states in a manner that Cong::ess could not directly mandate). 
165Jd. at 209. 
166Jd. at 209. 
167 ld. What the Court did not address was the required degree of connection between 
the conditional grant and the general-welfare interest. A second limitation on the 
Spending power holds that a conditional grant may be illegitimate if unrelated to the 
federal interest. Id. at 207. Amici urged the Court to adopt a direct-relationship test to 
question the validity of an exercise of Spending power. ld. at 209 n.3. Since the issue was 
not raised by either of the parties, the Court left the indirect/ direct relationship inquiry 
for another day. ld. 
168Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 
u.s. 1, 17 (1981)). 
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into compulsion.'"169 Because South Dakota stood to lose only five percent of 
its highway fundin~ however, the Court reasoned that, in this instance, 
coercion was more rhetoric than fact.170 
The last restriction articulated by the Court was that the conditional grant of 
federal funds may be limited by other constitutional provisions.171 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist stated that although the Tenth Amendment bars interference 
with state affairs, it does not place limits on the range of conditions placed 
legitimately on federal grants.172 In other words, the Spending power "may not 
be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutiona1."173 The Court viewed the minimum drinking age issue as, 
essentially, cooperative federalism-providing the state with a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory choice.174 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that Congress was 
attempting to cross a line of state sovereignty drawn by the Twenty-first 
Amendment.175 O'Connor viewed the Spending power as a means to regulate 
commerce in a way which is prohibited by the Twenty-first Amendment.176 
This is a situation which would lie directly within the "other constitutional" 
limitations imposed on the Spending Clause.177 Furthermore, Justice 
O'Connor could not find a sufficient connection between minimum drinking 
ages and highway construction.178 The connection between the two was both 
over, and under-inclusive.179 It reached minors who did not intend to drive, 
and did not reach people in excess of the minimum age who contributed greatly 
to the drunk driving problem.ISO While Congress did have the power to grant 
funds in order to attain safe highway~, changing the social structure of the state 
did nothing to further this interest.181 
According to the dissent, the appropriate test would be whether the 
"spending requirement or prohibition is a condition on a grant, or if it is a 
169Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 
(1937)). 
170Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
171Jd. at 208. 
l72Jd. at 210 (emphasis added); see also infra Part V.C. 
173Id. 
174fd.at211. 
175Dole, 483 U.S. at 212. 
176fd. 
177 Id. at 218. 
178Jd. at 213-14. 
179Id. at 214-15. 
180Dole, 483 U.S. at 214-15. 
181Jd. at 215. 
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regulation."l82 Congress should only have the power to condition a grant on 
how funds are spent.183 Otherwise, it is a regulation and not a grant.l84 Justice 
O'Connor reasoned that if Congress is allowed to use the Spending power to 
regulate rather than to provide grants, the truth, "given the vast financial 
resources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause gives 'power 
to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and 
to become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such 
as are self imposed.' "185 Congress remains an instrument of enumerated 
powers, and the Spending Clause is impliedly limited by the extent of these 
powers.186 
C. The Constitutionality of the CAAA 
In enacting the CAAA, Congress may be viewed as having protected its 
mandates from Tenth Amendment invalidation by using the Spending Clause's 
shield. Defenders of constitutional-federalism values should not view this 
situation apprehensively. The Spending power has been abused in recent years 
and needs some adjustment to fortify the other constitutional principles that it 
threatens. 
1. The CAAA:s Tenth Amendment Difficulties 
The CAAA is the perfect vehicle for examining how the Spending Clause 
has validated an otherwise unconstitutional intrusion upon state sovereignty. 
Assuming, in a vacuum, that the CAAA presents no Spending Clause question, 
the Act's Tenth Amendment legitimacy is, in itself, questionable. 
The easiest starting point for examining the Tenth Amendment infirmities 
inherent within the CAAA is the Act's Permit Program. The Permit Program 
requires the Governor of each state to submit a licensing plan to the CAA 
Administrator.187This is a direct congressional command to a state's executive 
branch to administer and promulgate a federal regulatory plan. It should sound 
familiar, for Printz v. United States addressed an analogous issue in the context 
of the Brady Act.188 Because the requirements of the Permit Program are 
182Id. at 216 (citation omitted). 
183Jd. 
l84Jd. 
185Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)). 
1B6Dole, 483 U.S. at 218. While Justice O'Connor did not expressly invoke the Tenth 
Amendment, the last paragraph of her dissent alludes that the Tenth Amendment may 
bar the Spending power. See John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth 
Amendment Since United Statesv. Darby,27CUMB. L. REv. 445,514-15 (1997);seealso Baker, 
supra note 164, at 1962-63. 
187 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(1) (1998). 
188117 S. Ct. 2365, 2369 (1997). Recall that the issue in Printz was whether Congress 
could require the states' executive officers to determine if potential handgun purchasers 
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virtually identical in functioning to the Brady Act,189 it is likely that a challenge 
brought under the Printz doctrine would be sustained. 
Printz articulates a bright-line rule against congressional enlistment of the 
states' executive branches. Whether Congress commandeers the executive 
branch as a whole, or its individual officers, it has crossed the line of dual 
sovereignty, and its actions are constitutionally infirm,l90 This analysis does 
not change regardless of the utter lack, or cognizable presence of a 
policyrnaking function,l91 In either case, Congress has sought to make an end 
run around the President and his appointed officers who are the only proper 
administrators of federallaw.192 To hold otherwise would allow Congress to 
have the states "dancing on its fingers like marionettes."193 
Standing alone, the CAAA's Permit Program fails Tenth Amendment 
scrutiny on the premise that it orders the state's executive branch to create and 
submit a licensing program for federal approval.194 The potential problem is 
whether Congress, by withholding state highway funding,I95 has fixed the 
Permit Program's constitutional defect with the Spending Clause. The same 
problem arises with the CAAA's State Implementation Plan requirement. 
Without the sanctioning provisions, the SIP represents a classic example of 
cooperative federalism. It seeks the aid of the states in creating and 
implementing the CAA, and if the state chooses not to cooperate, the federal 
government takes over.196 What complicates the matter is that before the 
federal government creates its own plan, the Spending Clause flexes its plenary 
authority and imposes sanctions on the state in the form of reduced highway 
funding,l97 
If the CAAA was merely a sanction imposed on a state for failing to comply 
with a legislative mandate, the constitutionality of the Act would be easy to 
met the requirements of a federal licensing program. I d. 
189Both the Permit Program and the Brady Act enlist the aid of the states' executive 
branch (CLEOs and Governors) to come up with the method of licensing different 
individuals. The Brady Act requires a CLEO to determine whether an individual is 
eligible to purchase a handgun, id., and the Permit Program requires the state Governor 
to determine what polluter is eligible for a license under the 1990 Amendments. 42 U .S.C. 
§ 7661a(d)(1) (1998). 
190 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382-83. 
191fd. at 2381. 
192[d. at 2378 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2). 
193Petitioner' s Argument Before the Supreme Court, at 29, Printz v. United States, 117 
S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (No. 95-1478). 
194See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382-83. 
195See 42 U.S.C. § 7.509 (1998). 
19642 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(l) (1998); see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,288-89 (1981). 
197See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7509(a)(4), 7410(m) (1998). 
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ascertain. Recall New York v. United States, which held a "take title" provision 
unconstitutional because Congress crossed the line separating encouragement 
from coercion.l98 By imposing a sanction for not complying with the federal 
program, the states were left with a choice between a rock and a hard place.I99 
Unlike the "take title" provision in New York, however, the CAAA appears to 
offer the states a choice between legislating in accordance with federal policies, 
or suffering the loss of a federal grant.200 This is a typical example of the 
Spending Clause being used to place conditions on the receipt of federal funds. 
The current problem that has halted federalism challenges to the CAAA is that 
the Supreme Court has never invalidated the conditional granting of federal 
funds.201 Holding the CAAA constitutionally defective is further complicated 
by commingling the Act's conditional grant with a system of cooperative 
federalism. 
The combination of conditional grants and conditional preemption is a 
merger of two valid constitutional principles.202 This combined model 
becomes: if the State wishes to receive federal funds for project X it must 
regulate area Y according to certain congressional commands; if the State does 
not wish to participate in area Y according to federal directives, the funds for 
project X will not be granted and the federal government will take over 
regulation of area Y. The CAAA, however, does not fit within this model 
because the amorphous presence of cooperative federalism is merely window 
dressing, and the conditional grant is more of a penalty than an inducement. 
The difference between the CAAA and a pure system of cooperative 
federalism is the timing of the sanctions in relation to the federal government's 
preemption of state activity. The Federal Implementation Plan becomes active 
only after the sanctions are imposed.203 There is no way for a state that does 
not wish to comply with the CAAA to jump immediately to the federal 
preemption stage-it must subject itself to the Act's sanctions.204 In this man-
I9Bsos u.s. 144, 175 (1992). 
199 Id. at 175-76. 
200See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7509(a)(4), 7410(m) (1998). 
201See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. 
L. REv. 1103, 1141, 1168 (1987). 
202See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (conditional grants); Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,288-89 (1981) (conditional 
preemption). 
203See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(l) (1998). The FIP is enacted two years after the designated 
time period in which a state is required to submit a SIP. Sanctions, on the other hand, 
are to be imposed at any time the Administrator becomes dissatisfied with the state's 
proposal. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m) (1998). 
204See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a) (1998). 
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ner, the CAAA closely parallels the federal command or penalty model which 
was held to be unconstitutional in New York.205 
Additionally, a sanction, by definition, is a "penalty for 
non-compliance . ... "206 In attaching the loss of highway funding to the failure 
to submit a SIP, Congress has imposed a penalty on the states to coerce 
compliance with the CAA. The Tenth Amendment forbids federal directives to 
state governments to legislate in a particular way.207 The imposition of 
penalties on the states for failing to comply with the CAAA is also 
constitutionally unacceptable because it" 'commandeer[s)' state governments 
into the service of the federal regulatory service .... "208 Furthermore, the fact 
that the sanctions are only temporary until the FIP activates is inconsequential. 
Whether a Spending power intrusion upon state sovereignty is minimal or 
temporary should not be relevant because there is still an untenable penalty 
assessed against the state for non-compliance.209 
2. Spending Clause Analysis 
Where the CAAA waters become murky is in the depths of the Spending 
Clause. Analyzing the Act in-once again-a vacuum, leads to the facile 
conclusion that the CAAA could be a valid exercise of the Spending power. 
This presupposition, however, disintegrates when the CAAA is examined as a 
whole under the substantive federalism theory.210 
Under Dole, the Spending power is legitimate where: (1) the conditional 
grant is for the general welfare; (2) a reasonable relationship exists between the 
governmental purpose and the condition; (3) Congress has provided an 
unambiguous statement that it intends to condition the federal grant on the 
performance of some action; and (4) there is no violation of an independent 
constitutional prohibition.211 The CAAA easily meets the first three of Dole's 
requirements. 
Efforts to clean up air pollution and reduce health hazards certainly fit within 
the "general welfare."212 Although it is questionable whether highway-funding 
205See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992). 
206AMERJCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1088 {2d college ed. 1985). 
207New York, 505 U.S. at 175. 
208[d. 
209 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997). But see Virginia v. Browner, 
80 F.3d 869, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445,448 (9th Cir. 
1989)). Because the loss of highway funds, subject to several exceptions, occurs only in 
non-attainment areas, the courts have been recalcitrant to find that the sanctions amount 
to coercive penalties when more severe funding restrictions have been upheld. I d. 
210See infra Part V.C. 
211South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,207-08 (1987). 
212See Browner, 80 F.3d at 881. The Browner court also held that the CAAA's sanctions 
do not cross the line where pressure turns into compulsion. I d. While this may be true, 
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sanctions are reasonably related to the federal interest in cleaning up air 
pollution, the CAAP.:s conditions are no more attenuated than the conditional 
grants in Dole.213 Furthermore, the relationship between conditional 
attachments and the federal interest, is a question on which the courts will defer 
to Congress.214 Finally, Congress has unambiguously stated its intention to 
condition highway funding on state compliance with the CAAA.215 
The final part of the Dole test-that there be no independent constitutional 
prohibition present216_is the most perplexing element of the test, and perhaps 
the key to extracting Excalibur. The "independent constitutional bar" limitation 
stands for the proposition that the Spending power may not be used to achieve 
ends which would be inherently unconstitutional.217 The question remains, 
then, whether the Tenth Amendment is a sufficiently strong constitutional bar 
that will limit Congress in its abuse of the Spending power. 
V. SUBSfANTIVE FEDERALISM 
The days of the "truism"218 have passed and the Supreme Court is examining 
state sovereignty with renewed vigor. Over the last few years, the Court has 
tightened the reigns on congressional authority that was believed to be 
absolute. It is this narrowing of Article I powers-through other constitutional 
limitations--that supports this Author's theory that the Tenth Amendment will 
be used as a substantive restraint on Congress's legislative strength. 
by failing to recognize the federalism problems with the Act, Browner has allowed an 
unconstitutional infringement upon state sovereignty to remain viable. 
213In Dole, highway funding was linked to raising the minimum drinking age to 
twenty-one years of age. 483 U.S. at 205. While there is certainly not a direct relationship 
between highway funding and either minimum-drinking ages or air pollution, the 
requirement is just that the connection be reasonably related to the federal interest. Id. 
at 207. But see Jeffrey Geiger, Note, Canary in a Cole Mine? Federalism and the Failure of the 
Clean Air Act Amendmentsof1990, 20 WM. & MARY ENvn.. L. & POL'Y REv. 81,102 (1995) 
(arguing that sanctions which decrease funding for highway improvement programs 
are not reasonably related to the encouragement of improved air quality standards); 
William]. Klein, Note,PressureorCompulsion? Federal Highway Fund SanclionsoftheClean 
Air Act Amendments of1990, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 855,867-68 (1995) (arguing a higher degree 
of connection between the conditions in Dole than with the conditions under the CAAA). 
214Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
215See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(m), 7661a(d)(2)(A-B). 
216Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
217Td. at 210. As an example, the Court proffered the hypothetical that Congress could 
not grant federal funds to states in return for the states inflicting cruel and unusual 
punishment on people. Id. 
218United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
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A. The Commerce Power Shrinks 
Prior to 1995, an exercise of the Commerce power had not been invalidated 
for nearly sixty years.219 That changed when the Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in United States v. Lopez,220 which struck down the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990.221 
In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified three valid types of commerce 
regulation: (1) regulation over channels of commerce; (2) regulation over 
instrumentalities of commerce; and (3) regulation over economic activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.222 The Gun-Free School Zones Act 
failed constitutional scrutiny because it was not an economic activity that 
might "substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."223 In order to find 
a substantial effect, the Court's precedent since 1937 has asked whether 
Congress's determination that an activity affects interstate commerce is 
rationaJ.224 In Lopez, Congress did not make concrete findings with respect to 
the substantial effect that guns in schools may have on interstate commerce.225 
Instead, Congress presupposed that interstate commerce was impacted 
through a theory of decreased "national productivity."226 The Court reasoned 
that allowing Congress to act under this tenuous auspice would give the 
legislative branch overreaching powers.227 
219The last case striking down Commerce legislation was decided in 1936 when the 
Court held that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to regulate 
working hours and wages of local mine workers under the Bituminous Coal Act. Carter 
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Subsequent to Carter, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, upset with the Court for hindering his New Deal program for economic 
recovery, threatened a "court-packing plan" in an effort to sway the Court's position on 
the Commerce Clause. LocKHART, supra note 78, at 85-86. The plan worked, id., and 
beginning the next year with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), 
the Court began a sixty-year expansion of federal power under the Commerce Clause. 
See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.,371 U.S. 224 (1963); 
United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); United States v. South-Eastern 
UnderwritersAss'n,322 U.S. 533 (1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB 
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 
58 (1937). 
220514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
22118 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1998). The Act prohibited the carrying of firearms within 
1000 feet of a school zone. 
222Jd. at 558-59. 
223Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
224See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 
(1981). 
225Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. 
226/d. at 564. 
227Id. at 565. 
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While the Court retained the rational-basis analysis, the level of scrutiny 
within the test, and the limits on the Commerce power have become more 
stringent.228 Federalism principles also formed the basis for the Court's 
decision.lf Congress has unfettered power under the Commerce Clause, it will 
encourage intrusion into areas of traditional state control such as criminal law 
enforcement, education, and child custody.229 To grant Congress this power, 
the Court would "have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would 
... convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power of the sort retained by the States."230 Furthermore, the Court was 
unwilling to conclude "that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not 
presuppose something not enumerated ... and that there will never be a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. ... "231 
B. The Eleventh Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
In addition to finding limits on an Article I power within the power itself, 
the Supreme Court has also turned to other constitutional embodiments of 
federalism to constrain Congress's legislative excesses. The Eleventh 
Amendment was originally enacted to protect a state's sovereign immunity 
from civil suits filed by citizens in federal courts.232 Recently, the Court held 
that this sovereign immunity cannot be invalidated through the Commerce 
Clause.233 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida examined the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
("IGRA") and its provision authorizing Indian tribes to bring federal suits 
against the state to force compliance with the Act.234 The issue presented was 
228See Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 
34 HARV. J. ON LEers. 525, 535-36 (1997). The rational basis test is no longer highly 
deferential to Congress or hypothetical justifications. ld. at 535 (citing Deborah Jones 
Merritt, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MlCH. L. REv. 674, 682 (1995)). The 
standard of review appears to be a more substantive analysis of "whether the regulated 
activity does in fact substantially affect interstate commerce." !d. at 536 (emphasis added). 
229Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 
230[d. at 567. 
23lfd. at 567-68 (citations omitted). 
232See ERWIN CHEMERNSI<Y, FEDERAL j URISDICTION § 7.2, at 369-72 (2d ed. 1994) 
(CHEMERJNSI<Y 1). In the words of Alexander Hamilton: 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the 
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense 
and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of 
the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of 
every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of 
this immunity ... it will remain with the State. 
/d. at 371-72 (quoting THE FEDERAL!Sf No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis in original)). 
233See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
234fd. at 47. 
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whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from subjecting states 
to suits in federal court to enforce Article llegislation.235 The majority held that 
IGRA violated the Eleventh Amendment because Congress is incapable of 
abrogating a state's immunity through an Article I power.236 
The Court applied a two-part test to determine if IGRA passed constitutional 
muster under the Eleventh Amendment. First, Congress's intention to override 
state immunity must be obvious from an unambiguous legislative 
statement.237 IGRA easily passed this test given the numerous references to the 
"State" in the Act.238 Second, Congress must have acted pursuant to a legitimate 
exercise of legislative power.239 When Congress passed IGRA, it failed to satisfy 
this prong. 
The petitioner's argument relied upon the holding of Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Company,240 which allowed Congress to abrogate state immunity through 
the Interstate Commerce Clause.241 The Court agreed that the reasoning in 
Union Gas was applicable to the Indian Commerce Clause, which 
"accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal 
Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause."242 Notwithstanding 
the petitioner's argument, Union Gas "deviated sharply from [the Court's} 
established federalism jurisprudence"243 and was expressly overruled.244 
Before the decision in Union Gas, the Court never held that Article III 
jurisdiction245 could be expanded by any constitutional provision other than 
the Fourteenth Arnendment.246 By overruling Union Gas, the Court reiterated 
that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principles of federalism which it 
235Jd. at 53. The Article I power at issue was the Indian Commerce Clause, which 
provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce . .' . with the 
Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, d . 3. The Indian Commerce Clause IS located m 
the same provision with the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
236Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76. 
237Jd. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,68 (1985)). 
238Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57. 
239Jd. at 55 (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 68). 
240491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
241Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61. 
242[d. 
243fd. at 63. 
244Jd. at 65. 
245See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
246Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5 ("The Congress 
shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article.") 
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protects, are not subject to Article I control.247 State sovereignty remains intact 
regardless of Congress's seemingly complete lawmaking authority under 
Article 1.248 
C. The Emergence of Substantive Federalism 
This Note posits a theory to curb the abuse of Congress's legislative 
authority. By embracing substantive federalism, Article I powers will be limited 
by the Tenth Amendment and will not enjoy a presupposition of validity. 
The history of the Tenth Amendment is an appropriate starting point in the 
development of substantive federalism. For a long period of time, the Tenth 
Amendment operated as nothing more than a plain statement of the obvious 
that afforded little protection to the states.249 In the aftermath of Garcill, state 
sovereignty was left to the political processes.250 Tenth Amendment power was 
reborn in New York v. United States when the Court held that Congress could 
not commandeer the states' legislative function.251 This protection is decreed 
no matter how strong the federal interest in the legislation may be.252 
Protections over state sovereignty were expanded again in the 1996 Term when 
the Court invalidated certain portions of the Brady Act.253 According to Printz, 
Congress cannot force the states' executive branches to enact federal regulatory 
programs regardless of the federal interest involved.254 Whenever the 
structural framework of dual sovereignty is compromised, the Tenth 
Amendment steps in to prevent a usurpation of federalism.255 
Printz and New York held that Congress was incapable of commanding the 
states to take a course of action that it could not undertake directly.256 But what 
happens if Congress breaches the Tenth Amendment through an Article I 
power like the Spending Clause? Do the Court' s enunciated protections extend 
to Article I? These are the questions that the theory of substantive federalism 
answers. 
The restraint on Article I began, to large extent, in Garcill when Justice 
O'Connor predicted that the Commerce power would be affirmatively limited 
247Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. 
248fd. 
249See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
250Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,552 (1985); see also South 
Carolina v . Baker, 485 U.S. 505,512 (1988). 
251 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992). 
252fd. at 178. 
253Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997). 
254Jd. at 2383-84. 
255Jd. 
256See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382; New York, 505 U.S. at 178. 
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by state autonomy.257 The door was further opened in New York when the 
plenary nature of the Commerce Clause was labeled as "subversive" to the 
interests of state sovereignty.258 United States v. Lopez put the first nail in the 
coffin when it struck down an exercise of the Commerce power as going so far 
as to approach a "police power of the sort retained by the States."259 The 
Commerce Clause, in other words, authorizes control over interstate 
commerce, but does not authorize regulation of the states.260 
Seminole Tribe, however, lends the greatest support to the substantive 
federalism theory. The Eleventh Amendment- a core guardian of state 
sovereign interests261-withstands any attempt by Congress to pierce the 
shield of federalism with Article J.262 Similar to the Tenth Amendment, the 
Eleventh Amendment once provided little protection to the states when 
Congress flexed its Article I muscle.263 Along with the strengthening of the 
Eleventh Amendment, New York and Printz add to the growth of federalism 
and the devolution of unrestricted congressional power. The same 5-4 
majority264 has written the opinions in New York, Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and 
Printz, and it is only a matter of time before the rationale in Seminole Tribe is 
extended to the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the Spending Clause.265 
Substantive federalism presents the argument that the Tenth Amendment 
will be used in much the same manner as the Eleventh Amendment was used 
in Seminole Tribe. If a core principle of state sovereignty will be encroached upon 
by an Article I power, the Tenth Amendment prohibits the intrusion.266 On the 
other side of the coin, Congress must look to the Tenth Amendment and ask 
whether its proposed legislation will impinge upon principles of federalism. If 
substantive federalism can operate to block congressional action under the 
Commerce Clause, then it can also curtail the Spending power.267 
257Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 587, 589 (1985). 
258505 U.S. at 180 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 138 Games Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
259514 u.s. 549, 567 (1995). 
260Fdntz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166). 
261See CHEMERINSKY I, supra note 232, at 369-72. 
262Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
263See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989). 
264See supra note 72. 
265Jnterestingly, the last case to strike down Spending Clause legislation limited the 
Spending power by applying federalism principles. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1 (1936). The Butler decision would allow federal spending programs that benefit the 
general welfare as long as state interests are not involved. Id. at 70. 
266Cf Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. 
267See generally Candice Hoke, State Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: 
Illusion, Reality and a Federalism Based Constitutional Challenge 9 STAN. L. & PoL 'Y REv. 
115, 121-22 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court's recent Tenth Amendment 
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The four-part test in Dole also supports this Note's theory that the Supreme 
Court would be willing to use the Tenth Amendment to control conditional 
spending.268The independent constitutional limitation prong269 seems readily 
acceptable to the notion of stronger Tenth Amendment sovereignty. Recall that 
Seminole Tribe asked whether Congress exercised a valid constitutional 
power.270 By enacting IGRA, Congress used an Article I power to infringe upon 
state sovereign interests.271 This was unconstitutional regardless of the 
comprehensive nature of the power granted to Congress.272 According to 
substantive federalism, and the independent constitutional bar prong of the 
Spending Clause, if Congress conditions funds on the commandeering of state 
governmental functions, then Congress has acted in an ultra vires manner and 
the legislation must be nullified. Under the Tenth Amendment, Congress 
cannot issue a mandate directly to the states. Under substantive federalism, the 
plenary nature of the Spending power does not alter the constitutional 
infirmity of a congressional action.273 
In addition to preventing Congress from sneaking unconstitutional 
commands to the states through the Spending Clause, limiting the Spending 
power also protects other federalism values. A broad Spending power appears 
to transfer political accountability from the federal government to the states.274 
decisions, and the Court's "openness"' to limiting congressional legislative power lends 
credence to reevaluating Spending Clause precedent); cf Baker, supra note 164, at 
1 %2-63; Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Care Reform: Tenth 
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489, 567 (1994) 
(arguing that the coercive potential of conditional grants under the Spending Clause 
and conditional preemption under the Commerce Clause destroys the federalism 
doctrine of New York). 
268See generally supra notes 171-74, 217; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITIJTIONAL LAw: 
PRINCIPLES AND POUClES § 3 .4.3, at 204 (1997) (CHEMERINSKY II) ("[A ]s the Supreme Court 
revives the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress's powers, the Court might impose 
greater restrictions on conditional spending.'") 
269South Dakota v. Dole,483 U.S. 203,208 (1987). 
270517 U.S. at 55. 
271 Id. at 72. 
272Jd. 
273Remember that Seminole Tribe held that the Indian Commerce Clause, which is a 
g reater grant of federal power than the Interstate Commerce Clause, did not alter the 
protections granted to the States under the Eleventh Amendment. 517 U.S. at 61, 72. 
While, arguably, Congress should possess a strong Spending power, see Baker, supra 
note 164, at 1916, having the impenetrable ability to reach any aspect of state government 
"render[s] the government of the Union too powerful, and ... enable[s] it to absorb in 
itself those ... authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States ...... 
TilE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 105 (Alexander Hamilton) Oacob E. Cooke ed., 1961 ). 
274See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: Mny Congress 
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1071 (1995); 
Note, Federalism, Political Accormta/Jility, and the Sperrding Clause, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 
1431-32 (1994). 
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Using the theory of substantive federalism curbs this transfer and enforces the 
underlying principle that the different spheres of the government are to remain 
accountable to their respective electorates.275 
Professor Caminker argues that (similar to the federal command or penalty 
model of New York) conditional grants pose the same risk of misblame and 
political liability that federal commandeering does.276 Essentially, state officials 
must make the choice between accepting Congress's condition or refusing 
federal funds.277 Either choice is likely to be unfavorable to some portion of 
their constituency who will see the state official as the only person who took 
action.278 The federal government, therefore, has removed itself from the local 
constituency's view.279 
The principles of political accountability that formed a basis for the New York 
decision280 apply with equal force to the Spending Clause. This Note argues 
that the Spending power is not unlimited. A federalism principle that has been 
used to affirmatively limit Congress's power is the doctrine of political 
accountability.281 When principles of state sovereignty are threatened-
whether by direct congressional action or indirect conditions on federal 
grants-the Tenth Amendment activates to prevent a usurpation of federalism 
values. Thus, if an exercise of the Spending power subjects the states to a 
constitutionally infirm regulation, or transfers political accountability from the 
federal government to the states, it is illegitimate and, pursuant to the theory 
of substantive federalism, needs to be reevaluated. 
VI. RESTRUCTIJRING 1HE CAAA 
With substantive federalism being only a stone's throw away from becoming 
reality, what does the future hold for the CAAA? The Act is fraught with 
constitutional questions, and unless its functioning is altered, it is unlikely that 
the evils of air pollution will be controlled through the CAAA. 
Currently, the CAA/l:s State Implementation Plan, Permit Program, and 
sanctioning provision offer states a choice between regulating according to 
federal directive, or losing highway funding. Through the use of the Spending 
Clause, the CAAA seeks to punish states that refuse to regulate according to 
Congress's command. New York v. United States holds that the combination of 
direct federal mandates and punishment for non-compliance represents a 
275See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
276Carninker, supra note 274, at 1071. 
277[d. 
278fd. 
279]d. 
280See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. 
281]d. 
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Hobson's choice between two equally unconstitutional actions.282 The CAAA 
seeks to use the Spending Clause's broad reach to constitutionalize an action 
directly contrary to the Tenth Amendment. Substantive federalism rejects this 
contingency.283 
The solution is to sever the sanctioning provision from the CAAA. Once the 
sanctioning provision is removed, the state has a choice between enacting 
federal regulatory programs, or surrendering control over air pollution to the 
federal government. This is the type of cooperative federalism model held to 
be constitutional in FERC and Hodel.284 With a firm system of cooperative 
federalism in place, the principles of the Tenth Amendment are being fulfilled, 
and the CAA is unlikely to suffer any adverse effects.285 
In general, the states will find ways to correct air pollution problems that 
extend beyond the CAA:s directives.286 Given that only Virginia and Missouri 
282505 U.S. 144,176 (1992); accord Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365,2381 (1997) 
(holding that direct commands to the States' executive officers are equally 
unconstitutional). 
283See supra notes 249-73 and accompanying text. 
284See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Although not the focus of this Note, 
FERC's conditional preemption model is troublesome. Whereas Hodel allows for 
continued state involvement and participation in formulating a federal regulatory plan, 
or submitting to total federal preemption (which is analogous to the CAAA minus the 
sanctioning provision), 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981), FERC requires the States to regulate 
according to direct congressional command without any participation in developing 
the underlying policies. 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982). As pointed out in FERC by Justice 
O'Connor's partial dissent, this type of federal mandate may violate democratic 
accountability concerns. Id. at 787. 
In the wake of Nw York and its progeny, it is possible that the FERC model of 
cooperative federalism may be overturned. One of the primary reasons for holding Nw 
York's "take title" provision unconstitutional was the transfer of democratic 
accountability from the federal government to the State. 505 U.S. at 168-69. In addition, 
New York's condemnation of directives that require the State to regulate according to 
federal standards, id. at 175-76, is likely to render the FERC model a choice between a 
rock and a hard place. In the words of Justice O'Connor, "there is nothing' cooperative' 
about a federal program that compels state agencies either to function as bureaucratic 
puppets of the Federal goverrunent or to abandon regulation of an entire field 
traditionally reserved to the state authority." FERC, 456 U.S. at 783; cf Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 
205, 270-73 (1997) (arguing that cooperative federalism is, in itself, unconstitutional 
because it effectively delegates federal legislative power, and accountability to the 
States). 
285See Geiger, supra note 213, at 113 n.206 (noting that the majority of governmental 
expenditures are made at the State and local level, and that the goals of the CAA are 
best served by a "true partnership effort" between Congress, the EPA and the States) 
(citations omitted). 
286See BRYNER, supra note 17, at 183. Allowing the States to act as laboratories for 
experimentation is one of the benefits of federalism values. CHEMERINSKY II, supra note 
268, § 3.8, at 224. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Id. at 225 (quoting 
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss1/8
1998} CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 195 
have challenged the 1990 Amendments, it is likely that a majority of the states 
would not have a problem with a system of cooperative federalism.287 While 
there is certainly a national interest in clean air, Congress cannot step beyond 
the Constitution and precepts of state sovereignty to meet those interests-the 
federalism doctrine forbids such an action.288 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The CAAA raises complex questions over the interplay between the Tenth 
Amendment and Congress's Article I powers. Given the broad powers granted 
to Congress under the Spending Clause, it is easy to see why principles of state 
sovereignty have been limited by the Spending power. The argument 
presented by this Note, however, is just the opposite. The course the Supreme 
Court is taking-as supported by key decisions in the areas of the Commerce 
Clause, and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments-suggests that the Spending 
Clause and other Article I powers may not be used to circumvent the 
constraints of federalism. This is the principle behind substantive federalism. 
Substantive federalism is a doctrinal approach to the Tenth Amendment that 
acts as a hand to extract a constitutional Excalibur from the stone of state 
sovereignty to assure that Congress keeps a mindful watch of the "powers ... 
reserved to the States."289 
MARK A. MlLLER290 
New State lee Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also 
Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 528-30. 
287Cf Geiger, supra note 213, at 113 n.206 (citing Paul R. Portney, The EPA at 
"Thirtysomething," 21 ENVTL. L. 1461, 1473 (1991)}. According to Mr. Geiger: 
[M]any states are not only regulating, but are also breaking new ground . 
. . . State environmentalism has also led to more active state legislatures 
and increasingly sophisticated environmental agencies. [T]he locus of 
environmental activity has increasingly shifted toward the state level 
with the rise in grass roots organizations and decentralization of nation-
al environmental advocacy groups. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
288See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 178. 
289U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
290The Author wishes to extend his gratitude to Professor Candice Hoke, Professor 
Karin Mika, and Jeffrey Rodgers for their helpful comments during the preparation of 
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